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CASE COMMENTS
ENFORCEABILITY OF EXCULPATORY CLAUSES IN
REALTY LEASES
Rules of law are rarely self-evident, but are rather the product
of conflicting policies and considerations. A graphic example of this
proposition is the dilemma created when one seeks by contratt to
avoid liability for negligence in the future. Judicial policy in favor
of freedom of contract is, of course, well-established. However, equally
well-entrenched in the law is the proposition that one should be held
to a standard of reasonable care and should not be relieved from
liability by a transaction that encourages careless behavior.
Exculpatory contracts have arisen out of various relationships,
such as those between bailor and bailee,' innkeeper and guest,2 tele-
graph company and sender,3 and landlord and tenant.4 It is with
reference to this last relationship that the law regarding the enforce-
ability of exculpatory contracts is most uncertain and conducive to
results appearing less than just. The problem was brought into sharp
focus in the recent Illinois case of O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith
Realty Co.5
During the acute housing shortage that followed World War 11,6
Virginia O'Callaghan rented a suite of rooms in an apartment house
owned by the Waller & Beckwith Realty Company. The plaintiff was
subsequently injured when she fell while crossing the paved courtyard
between the garage and her apartment. She brought an action7 for
damages, alleging that her injuries were caused by the negligent main-
tenance of the pavement by the defendant realty company. The de-
fendant contended that the action was barred by an exculpatory
clause in the plaintiff's lease.8 At the trial level, the jury returned a
sex offense, such as statutory rape or adultery, and when both offenses involve the
same persons. A good case may be made for the relaxation of the rule in such a case
because the prior offense shows the relationship and mental attitude of the parties.
9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 86 (1952). See also Annot., 167 A.L.R. 565 (1947).




515 Ill. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545 (1958).
0"[H]ousing shortages were so acute that 'waiting lists' were the order of the
day, and gratuities to landlords to procure shelter where common." 155 N.E.2d at
547-
7Actually, the plaintiff died while this action was pending, and her administra-
tor prosecuted the suit.
8The clause, as reported in the opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court, 146
N.E.2d 198, 199-2oo, provided: "Neither the lessor nor his agents shall be liable to
the lessee (nor shall rent be abated) for injury to person or damage to or loss of
i96o]
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verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $14,000, whereupon the de-
fendant appealed. The Appellate Court reversed,9 and, in the opinion
herein discussed, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the reversal,
holding that the exculpatory clause constituted a complete bar to the
action. This decision, with a vigorous two-judge dissent, points up
the diverse treatment given this problem by different courts, employ-
ing varying degrees of logic and justice. Prior to the O'Callaghan
decision, there were roughly three approaches to the problem.
The view taken by the large majority of courts is that there are
two questions: (i) "Was there a disparity of bargaining power in the
plaintiff at the time the lease was executed? (2) Is there a public in-
terest in the relationship, upon which the exculpatory clause in the
lease impinges? If either of these questions is answered affirmatively,
the contractual disclaimer of liability should not act as a bar to the
plaintiff's recovery.10 The majority of courts conclude as a matter of
law that neither question can be affirmatively answered when the
exculpatory provision occurs in a lease of realty." These courts say
that stipulations between landlord and tenant regarding who will
bear the risk of loss or injury "are not matters of public concern.
property wherever located from any cause or for damage claimed for eviction
actual or constructive; this provision includes particularly but not exclusively all
claims arising from the building or any part thereof being or becoming out of
repair .... or from any act of neglect of Lessor or his agents....
115 Ill. App. 2d 349, 146 N.E.2d 198 (1957).
"Courts have answered either or both of these questions affirmatively, and
hence imposed liability, when the exculpatory contract arose out of the fol-
lowing relationships: bailor and bailee, Hotels Statler Co. v. Safiler, iog Ohio St.
638, 134 N.E. 460 (1921); innkeeper and guest, Oklahoma City Hotel Co. v. Levine,
189 Okla. 331, 116 P.2d 997 (1941); telegraph company and sender, Primrose v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1 (1894).
"E.g., Inglis v. Garland, 19 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 767, 64 P.2d 5o (1936); King
v. Smith, 47 Ga. App. 360, 170 S.E. 546 (1933); Simmons v. Columbus Venetian
Stevens Bldgs., Inc., 20 Ill. App. 2d 1, 155 N.E.2d 372 (1958); Franklin Fire Ins.
Co. v. Noll, 115 Ind. App. 289, 58 N.E.2d 947 (194 5 ); Cobb v. Gulf Ref. Co., 284
Ky. 523, 145 S.W.2d 96 (1940); Manaster v. Gopin, 330 Mass. 596, i16 N.E.2d 134
1953); J. W. Grady Co. v. Herrick, 288 Mass. 304, 192 N.E. 748 (1934); Clarke v.
Ames, 267 Mass. 44, 165 N.E. 696 (1929); Mackenzie v. Ryan, 230 Minn. 378, 41
N.W.2d 878 (195o); Weirick v. Hamm Realty Co., 179 Minn. 25, 228 N.W. 175
(1929); Gralnick v. Magid, 292 Mo. 391, 238 S.W. 132 (1921); Wood v. Security Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 112 Neb. 66, 198 N.W. 573 (1924); Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor
Adv. Co., 258 N.Y. 489, i8o N.E. 245 (1932); Burnett v. Texas Co., 204 N.C. 460,
168 S.E. 496 (1933); Manius v. Housing Authority, 350 Pa. 512, 39 A.2d 614 (1944);
Cannon v. Bresch, 307 Pa. 31, i6o At. 595 (1932)-
However, even the broadest excnlpatory clause will not relieve the landlord from
the consequences of his affirmative negligence. Spangler v. Hobson, 212 Ala. 105, 101
So. 828 (1924); Dickey v. Wells, 203 Ill. App. 305 (1917); Rolfe v. Tufts, 216 Mass.
563, 104 N.E. 341 (1914).
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Moreover, the two stand on equal terms; ... either may equally well
accept or refuse entry into the relationship .... "12
A second approach to the problem is that adopted by New Jersey
and the District of Columbia. The New Jersey case of Kuzmiak v.
Brookchester, Inc.13 involved a tenant who was injured on a stairway
negligently constructed by the defendant landlord. In a suit for
damages the defendant contended that the action was barred by an
exculpatory clause in the lease. The New Jersey court, in holding that
the clause did not bar the action, took judicial notice of a housing
shortage and concluded that the element of unequal bargaining power
was present. The court noted that "'relative bargaining strength,
although the most convenient touchstone, does not furnish an in-
fallible basis of prediction in each and every case .... The example
par excellence is the relationship of landlord and tenant. While
once a relationship of equals, it has very definitely changed during
the last few years into one in which the landlord occupies a superior
position.... •14 Similarly, the District of Columbia case of Kay v.
Cain,15 although holding that the exculpatory clause did not apply to
the type of negligence complained of, stated that even if the clause had
applied, it would have been no obstacle to recovery in light of a then
current housing shortage which in itself created a disparity of bargain-
ing power.10
The third, the most unequivocal view, is that taken by New
Hampshire. Pursuant to a broad policy against exculpatory contracts
in all contexts, the New Hampshire court, in Papakalos v. Shaka, 
7
without regard to the considerations of public interest and unequal
bargaining power, made the blanket statement that a landlord may
not in any case relieve himself from the common law duty to employ
due care.
This, then, was the judicial climate at the time the O'Callaghan
case was argued. On the one hand, there is "the inconsistency that
society should work through many years to establish the rights and
obligations of the parties to a legal relationship and, once those price-
12Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor Adv. Co., 258 N.Y. 489, i8o N.E. 245, 247
(1932).
1333 N.J. Super. 575, 111 A.2d 425 (1955).
I"its A.2d at 431.
15154 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
""The acute housing shortage in and near the District of Columbia gives the
landlord so great a bargaining advantage over the tenant that such an exemption
might well be held invalid on grounds of public policy." Id. at 306.
1191 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941).
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less principles are established, that people could throw them away
in the name of freedom of contract and submit themselves to the very
hazards and dangers from which those principles were established to
protect them."'18 On the other hand, there is sanctity of contract, an
obstacle summarily disposed of by courts which look with disfavor
upon exculpatory clauses.]9
Faced with these conflicting arguments, the O'Callaghan court
reacted strangely. There seems to have been little or no bargaining
power in the plaintiff; there was a widespread housing shortage,20 and
the record plainly showed that had the plaintiff quibbled about terms,
the apartment would not have been rented to her.21 Also, she would
have been confronted with the same clause in virtually every urban
lease in use at the time. Thus, even if it is conceded that there is no
public interest in the ordinary landlord-tenant relationship, does not
the fact that vast numbers of people are being systematically deprived
of their common law rights when no practical alternative is open to
them, create such public interest as is necessary to empower a court
to reach a just result? In this instance the position of landlord assumes
the same monopolistic characteristics inherent in that of a carrier or
a telegraph company. However, the Illinois court rejected this ar-
gument, not on the basis of any of the three aforementioned views,
but because in its opinion "the subject is one that is appropriate for
legislative rather than judicial action." 22 In this-the court's justifica-
tion for its own inaction-lies the key to the problem. "Judicial de-
termination of public policy," reasons the court, "cannot readily take
account of gporadic and transitory circumstances."2 3 But is the judici-
ary not better equipped than the legislature to deal with a crisis no
less desperate for its suddenness? Courts effectively deal with parties
before them, while legislative relief often proves slow and cumber-
some. Moreover, this type of legislative action operates prospectively
"Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens Bldgs., Inc., 2o Ill. App. 2d 1, 155
N.E.2d 372, 379 (1958)-
"See note io supra. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 568 (1923), said that "pretty much all law consists in for-
bidding men to do some things that they want to do, and contract is no more
exempt from law than other acts."
21See note 6 supra.
1155 N.E.2d at 550 .
mId. at 547.
2Ibid. Evidently feeling bound by a statement in Simmons v. Columbus Vene-
tian Stevens Bldgs., Inc., note x8 supra, a case which admitted that the plaintiff was
under tremendous economic coercion and yet held him to be barred, the court said
that "public policy cannot be determined on the hardship of an individual case."
